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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20000541-CA
Priority No. 2

ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK,
Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction Attempted
Unlawful Possession/Use of a Controlled Substance, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i)
(Supp. 2000), and Unlawful Possession/Use of a Controlled
Substance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000), in the Third Judicial District
Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, Judge,
presiding.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

See Addendum A (Judgment

and Conviction).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE: Did the trial court err as a matter of law in
sentencing Appellant in absentia in violation of his due process
rights?
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court errs in sentencing
a defendant in absentia presents a question of law reviewed for
correctness.
1996).

See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah

PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Anthony James Wanosik's ("Mr. Wanosik") objection
to the trial court's sentencing in absentia is preserved on the
record for appeal ("R.") at 54[3-4].
RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a)(2) (2000) - The Trial:
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel. The
defendant shall be personally present at the trial with
the following exceptions: . . . (2) In prosecutions for
offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the
case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had
been present.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) (2000) - Sentence,
Judgment and Commitment:
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or
plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor
more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the
court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise
orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the
defendant or may continue or alter bail or
recognizance.
Before imposing sentence
the court shall afford
the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to
present any information in mitigation of punishment, or
to show any legal cause why sentence should not be
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given
an opportunity to present any information material to
the imposition of sentence.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(b) (2000) - Sentence,
Judgment and Commitment:
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried
in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be
sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails
2

to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's
arrest may be issued by the court.
United States Constitution Amendment XIV:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
tria by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings,
and Disposition in the Court Below.
Mr. Wanosik was charged by information with one count of
unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); one
count of unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i); and one count of unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998).
warrant issued.

R.5-6 (Information).

R.l.

3

An arrest

On April 11, 2000, Mr. Wanosik pled guilty to attempted
unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation Utah Code Ann. § 58-3~7-8(2) (a) (i), and
unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i),
before Judge Atherton.

R.18-24

Entry); 53 (Plea Colloquy).

(Guilty Plea); 27-28 (Minute

Sentencing was set for May 26, 2000,

at 8:30 a.m. before Judge Frederick.

R.28.

Mr. Wanosik1s legal defender was present at the sentencing.
R.29,54.
30, 54[2].
54[3].

However, Mr. Wanosik himself failed to appear.

R.29,

The court sentenced Mr. Wanosik in absentia.

R.30,

The court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of

law on June 14, 2000.

R.34-36.

Mr. Wanosik appeals from the trial court's sentencing in
absentia.

R.39.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Mr. Wanosik was observed by a Salt Lake police officer as he
rummaged through donated items left at a Deseret Industries
store, and then pick up something and place it in his pocket.
R.6.

The officer stopped Mr. Wanosik for theft.

Id.

A computer

check revealed an outstanding warrant, and Mr. Wanosik was
arrested.

Id.

During a search incident to arrest, the officer

found a gas torch nozzle in Mr. Wanosik's pocket.

Id.

Mr.

Wanosik stated that he found it at Deseret Industries.

Id.

4

A

continued search revealed small containers containing
methamphetamine.

Id.

pipes in his pockets.

Mr. Wanosik then stated that he had two
Id.

Mr. Wanosik1s pockets.

The officer also found five knives in

R.7.

At the jail, two more bags of

methamphetamine and a bag of marijuana were found on Mr. Wanosik.
Id.
Based on this evidence, Mr. Wanosik pled guilty to class A
attempted unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance and
class B unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance before
Judge Atherton.

R.18-24

(Plea Colloquy).

(Guilty Plea); 27-28 (Minute Entry); 53

At the plea hearing, he was ordered to report

to AP&P for a PSR.

R.27-28, 53[7].

He was also informed that

sentencing was set for May 26, 2000, at 8:30 a.m. before Judge
Frederick.

Id.

Mr. Wanosik was never informed that he could be

sentenced in absentia.

See generally R.53 (Plea Hearing).

Mr. Wanosik reported to AP&P as required, and the PSR report
was completed.

R.52.

AP&P recommended that he be sentenced to

20 days in jail with credit for time served and then committed to
a substance abuse treatment program.

R.52[ll].

The sentencing hearing was duly held on May 26, 2000.
30, 54.

Mr. Wanosik's attorney was present.

However, Mr. Wanosik was not present.
Fact), 54[2].

R.29-

R.29-30, 54.

R.29-30, 35 (Findings of

Mr. Wanosik did not appear at any time during the

morning calendar.

R.35.

Defense counsel explained that Mr.

Wanosik probably had the wrong date, and was intending to appear,
5

given that he followed through with the order to report to AP&P
for the preparation of the PSR.

R.54[2].

She also noted that

Mr. Wanosik had no reason to avoid sentencing because the PSR
gave a favorable sentencing recommendation, which included 20
days in jail and commitment to a substance abuse program,.

Id.

Accordingly, she asked the court to wait before issuing an arrest
warrant to give her time to locate him.

Id.

The court issued an arrest warrant on account of Mr.
Wanosik 1 s failure to appear.

R.31-32 (Arrest Warrant); 54[2-3].

It proceeded with sentencing over defense counsel's objection.
R.29-30, 54[3-4].

The judge concluded that Mr. Wanosik

"voluntarily absent [ed] himself from these proceedings'7 since he
did not contact the court or his attorney.

R.54[3].

Contrary to

AP&P f s recommendation, the judge sentenced Mr. Wanosik to
concurrent maximum jail terms of one year for the class A
misdemeanor and six months for the class B misdemeanor.
54[3].

R.29-30,

The court informed defense counsel that Mr. Wanosik may

have a rehearing if he showed up before being arrested.

R.54[3].

Mr. Wanosik has not been arrested on this warrant.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court violated due process and Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 22 (2000) when it sentenced Mr. Wanosik in
absentia to the maximum sentence without giving any party the
opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing and

6

without basing the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable
information.

Moreover, the error was harmful since the record

shows that Mr. Wanosik would have been a candidate for probation
had the judge conducted a full sentencing hearing and based the
sentencing determination on relevant and reliable information.
The trial judge further violated due process, the Article I,
Section 12 right to appear and defend, and Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 22 and abused his discretion in sentencing Mr. Wanosik
in absentia.

Mr. Wanosik was never informed that sentencing

would proceed if he were not present.
knowingly waive the right to presence.

He therefore did not
In addition, the judge

did not fully consider whether the public interest required that
Mr. Wanosik be sentenced in absentia.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
IT SENTENCED MR. WANOSIK WITHOUT BENEFIT OF ARGUMENT
FROM EITHER DEFENSE COUNSEL OR THE PROSECUTOR, AND IN
MR. WANOSIK'S ABSENCE.
Judge Frederick erred as a matter of law in sentencing Mr.
Wanosik in absentia.

R.54[2-4]; see State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d

1107, 1108 (Utah 1996).

The judge did so over defense counsel's

objection and without any input material to sentencing from
either defense counsel or the prosecutor.

See generally R.54.

The following colloquy transpired between defense counsel
and Judge Frederick:
Defense Counsel (Andrea Garland): Your Honor, . . .

7

I've looked for [Mr. Wanosik] but I've not been able to
find him, your Honor. He did obtain his pre-sentence
report.
Court: Is Anthony James Wanosik in the courtroom?
(No
response). Yes, let's discuss that matter. . . . Ms.
Garland, you're appearing in his behalf?
Defense Counsel: I am, your Honor. I think given that
he did go and obtain his pre-sentence report he was
intending to show up today, and so I would ask that you
hold on to any warrants and give me a chance to find
him. I believe he may have simply written down the
wrong date.
Court: Well Defense Counsel: I believe that, Judge, because this is
a fairly favorable pre-sentence report, so he would
have had no reason to try and avoid court today, it
would Court: Presumably.
Defense Counsel: Yes, it would have been in his best
interest to appear.
Court: I think in the meantime, counsel, given his
failure to appear I will terminate his pre-trial
release, issue a warrant for his arrest returnable
forthwith no bail. My inclination is to sentence him
today, and I recognize you would prefer that I did not,
but I am inclined to do so. It is curious that he has
failed to appear today, although I can only assume
because he has not been in touch with you nor has he
been in touch with my court that he has chosen to
voluntarily absent himself from these proceedings.
Consequently, it is the judgment and sentence of
this Court that he serve the term provided by law in
the adult detention center of one year for the class A
misdemeanor crime of attempted possession
of a
controlled substance, and six months for the possession
of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor charge to
which he has pled guilty. I will order that those
terms be served concurrently and not consecutively, and
that they be imposed forthwith.
Ms. Garland, in the event he is in touch with you
or shows up before he's arrested, then you may approach
me, but in the meantime, Mr. D'Alesandro, you prepare
8

the findings of fact [and] conclusions of law and order
determining voluntary absent compliance, and that will
be the order.
Defense Counsel: Judge, I would object to that order
because I don't think that it takes into account his
due process rights or his rights about Court: Right.
Defense Counsel: However, I realize thatfs your order.
Court: Your objection is noted.
R.54[2-4].
A. The Trial Court Violated Due Process and Utah R.
Crim. P. 22 When it Sentenced Mr. Wanosik Without
Considering Relevant and Reliable Information and
Without Affording Defense Counsel or the Prosecutor the
Opportunity to Speak at Sentencing.
The state and federal due process clauses

vv

require[] that a

sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant
information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence."
State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); see also State v.
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah) (state and federal due
process protections applicable to sentencing require that judge
make sentencing decision based on reliable and relevant
information), superceded by statute on other grounds State v.
Trvba, 2000 UT App 230, 401 Utah Adv. Rep. 4; see also U.S.
Const, amend. XIV (Due Process); Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 (same).
A sentence which is not based on reliable and relevant
information must be vacated.

See State v. Cesarez, 656 P.2d

1005, 1009 (Utah 1982) (vacating sentence where defendant was not
supplied with a copy of the pre-sentence report); Johnson, 856

9

P.2d at 1071-75 (vacating sentence based on unreliable hearsay
report).
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) (2000) effectuates the
due process relevance and reliability requirements by requiring
sentencing judges to give both the defense and the prosecution an
opportunity to present any information which might be material to
the sentence.

The rule states in part:

Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to
present any information in mitigation of punishment, or
to show any legal cause why sentence should not be
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given
an opportunity to present any information material to
the imposition of sentence.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a); see Howell, 707 p.2d at 118 ("[t]o ensure
fairness in the sentencing procedure, [Rule 22(a)] directs trial
courts to hear evidence from both the defendant and the
prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to be imposed").
Allowing defense counsel in particular, who acts as advocate for
the defendant, to make such a statement and provide such
information furthers the due process requirement of a fair and
reliable sentencing proceeding.

See generally Cesarez, 656 P. 2d

at 1007 ("[s] entencing is a critical stage of a criminal
proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel").

It also ensures that a defendant facing

sentencing is afforded his Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel at sentencing.

Id. ; see also U.S. Const.

amend. VI (Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel).
10

Rule 22(a) also allows a defendant to make an allocution
statement at sentencing.

See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 371

(Utah 1993) (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)) (Durham, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (joined by Stewart, J., and Zimmerman,
J., in the result); see also Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (right to
allocution at sentencing "is an inseparable part of the right to
be present" guaranteed by Utah Const. Art. I, § 12). The right
to allocution is defined as the "[f]ormality of court's inquiry
of defendant as to . . . whether he would like to make a
statement on his behalf and present any information in mitigation
of sentence."

Black's Law Dictionary 76 (6th ed. 1990).

The

right to allocution at sentencing is another safeguard of due
process reliability and relevance guarantees because "there are
times when a plea in mitigation can best be presented by the
defendant:

f

The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak

for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence,
speak for himself. 1 "

5 LeFave, Criminal Procedure § 26.4(g) at

778 (2d ed. 1999) (quoting Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301,
305, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961)).
In light of the foregoing, Judge Frederick erred as a matter
of law in sentencing Mr. Wanosik to the maximum concurrent jail
sentence for class A (one year) and B (six months) misdemeanor
offenses to which he pled guilty.

R.54[4].

First, the judge did

not allow either defense counsel or the prosecutor "an
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition
11

of sentence" in violation of Rule 22(a).

Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).

The only remarks made by defense counsel concerned Mr. Wanosik!s
absence, but nothing regarding the factors in mitigation of
sentencing.

See generally R.54[2-4].

The prosecutor was not

afforded any opportunity to speak to sentencing.

Id.

Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that Judge
Frederick considered the PSR, which recommends a drastically
different sentence than the maximum jail sentence imposed by the
judge: 20 days in jail, with credit for time served, plus
completion of a substance abuse program.
Recommendation); 54 [2-4].

R.52 (PSR - Agency

The judge does not make a single

mention of the PSR throughout the sentencing hearing, or in the
written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and accompanying
order.

R.34-38 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order)

(Addendum B ) ; 54 [2-4].

Indeed, the record is silent as to any

relevant factual basis justifying the imposition of the sentence
in this case other than Mr. Wanosik's absence.

Id.

Such a

paucity of information does not satisfy the relevance and
reliability standards required by Rule 22(a) and due process at
sentencing.

See Howell, 707 P.2d at 118; Johnson, 856 P.2d at

1071; U.S. Const, amend. XIV (Due Process); Utah Const. Art. I, §
7 (same).
In addition, the court did not satisfy such standards where
Mr. Wanosik personally was not present to argue factors in
mitigation of his sentence.

See Young, 853 P.2d at 371
12

(defendant's right to allocution guaranteed under Rule 22(a));
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (right to allocution at sentencing is
"inseparable part of the right to be present" guaranteed by Utah
Const. Art. I, § 12).

In Mr. Wanosik!s absence and without his

personal input, the trial court further lacked the indicia of
reliability and relevance required by due process to the extent
that it did not receive his unique, and possibly more persuasive
argument, for a mitigated sentence.

See Green, 365 U.S. at 305

("[t]he most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a
defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak
for himself"); see also Young, 853 P.2d at 371; Anderson, 929
P.2d at 1111-12; U.S. Const, amend. XIV (Due Process); Utah
Const. Art. I, § 7 (same); Utah Const. Art. I, § 12.
In short, the trial court violated Rule 22(a) and state and
federal due process where it sentenced Mr. Wanosik without
benefit of any material input to sentencing from the defense or
prosecution; where the record does not establish that the court
referenced the PSR in any way, or otherwise set forth a relevant
evidentiary basis for the maximum jail sentence; and where Mr.
Wanosik was not personally present to present an allocution
statement.

Accordingly, the court erred as a matter of law.

B. The Trial Court Violated Due Process and Utah R.
Crim. P. 22 by Sentencing Mr. Wanosik in Absentia Where
the Record Does Not Establish That He Knowingly and
Voluntarily Waived His Right to Be Present and Defend
at Sentencing.
In addition to failing to comply with Rule 22(a) and due
13

process in conducting the sentencing hearing without input from
the parties, Judge Frederick also violated due process and Rule
22 when he sentenced Mr. Wanosik in absentia.
Criminal Procedure 22(b) states,
defendant may be tried m

Utah Rule of

XN

[o]n the same grounds that a

defendant's absence, defendant may

likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence.

If a defendant

fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest
may be issued by the court/'

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure

17(a)(2) outlines the grounds for trial in a defendant's absence.
It states in pertinent part:
In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death,
the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after
notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not
prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as
if defendant had been present [.]
Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (a) (2) .
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applicable to this case
through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, guarantee
the right to be present at sentencing.

See Anderson, 929 P.2d at

1109-10; United States v. McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C.
1969).

Any waiver of this right to be present "must be voluntary

and involve an intentional relinquishment of a known right."
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110 (citation omitted).

The burden is on

the state to establish waiver, and a knowing and voluntary waiver
may not be presumed by the trial court.
14

See State v. Houtz, 714

P.2d 677, 678-79 (Utah 1986).
In order to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to be
present at sentencing, the defendant must be given notice of the
proceedings.

See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110.

In addition, the

directive given the defendant must provide sufficient warning
that the hearing will proceed even if the defendant is not
present for a knowing waiver of the right to presence to occur.
See McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1129-30.
In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that sentencing the
defendant in absentia did not violate the defendant's right to
allocution where the defendant was informed of the trial date and
signed a written waiver of his right to be present at trial, then
had no further contact with trial counsel and failed to appear at
trial and sentencing.

929 P.2d at 1110-11.

The Court recognized

that the right to allocution at sentencing "is an inseparable
part of the right to be present" found in Article I, Section 12
of the Utah Constitution.

Id. at 1111.

Anderson waived that

right to allocution by his voluntary absence after being informed
of the trial date, his execution of a written waiver of his right
to be present, his failure to appear at trial, and his failure to
keep in touch with defense counsel or appear at sentencing.

Id.

at 1110-11.
The Utah Supreme Court relied on McPherson in reaching its
conclusion that Anderson waived his right to be present.
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110.

See

In McPherson, the D.C. Court of
15

Appeals focused on the nature of the communication with the
defendant in determining whether he knowingly waived his right to
be present at trial.

See 421 F.2d at 1129-30.

The focus in

determining waiver, then, is on whether the record demonstrates
that the defendant knew that the hearing would proceed in his
absence.

Id.

The trial judge in McPherson made it clear that

the defendant was to be present.

Id. at 1130.

The McPherson

court reasoned that although the defendant knew that serious
consequences could occur if he did not appear, the record failed
to demonstrate that he knew that the trial would proceed in his
absence if he were not present, and therefore failed to establish
a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence.

Id.

The focus in McPherson on whether the defendant knew the
hearing would proceed regardless of whether he was present is
consistent with Anderson, where the defendant knew that the trial
would proceed without him since he "executed a written waiver of
his right to be present."

Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110.

It is

also consistent with other Utah case law which does not directly
address the issue of whether a knowing waiver occurs when the
defendant is not informed that the hearing will proceed in his
absence.

See, e.g., State v. Waastaff, 772 P.2d 987, 989-91

(Utah App. 1989)(considering only whether the defendant's absence
at trial was voluntary, and not analyzing whether a knowing
waiver occurs where the record does not demonstrate that the
defendant knew the hearing would proceed without him if he did
16

not appear); State v. Myers, 508 P.2d 41, 42-43 (Utah 1973)
(same).
In the present case, Mr. Wanosik was informed of the
sentencing date by Judge Atherton during the plea hearing.
R.53[7].

The record does not demonstrate, however, that he was

ever informed that sentencing would proceed in his absence if he
did not appear at sentencing.

See generally R.53.

The serious

consequences that Mr. Wanosik faced could include an issuance of
a bench warrant, see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b), or sentencing far in
excess of the 20 days jail time and mandatory substance abuse
treatment program recommended in the PSR without benefit of any
input from him personally.

The lack of any colloquy with Mr.

Wanosik regarding these serious consequences does not satisfy the
requirement that he be adequately informed about the possibility
of sentencing in absentia.

See McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1130.

Thus, the record fails to establish a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the due process and Article I, Section 12 right to be
present at sentencing.
Anderson indicated that "[p]ractical considerations also
mitigate[d] in favor of in absentia sentencing" in that case.
929 P.2d at 1111.

The Court's concern was that the defendant

could absent himself for years "and the eventual sentencing would
have to be performed by a judge who was unfamiliar with the case
and had no access to the relevant information."

Id.

In this

case, Judge Frederick did not preside over the plea hearing,
17

i

R.54; another judge, Judge Atherton, accepted the plea

R.53.

Hence, Judge Frederick was not: privy to the information presented
at the plea hearing which might have been relevant to sentencing.
Moreover, to the extent that he did not allow any party to
present evidence material to sentencing at the sentencing
hearing, his sentencing decision was not informed by such
information either.

Consequently, a concern that Mr. Wanosik

would eventually be sentenced by a judge who knew nothing about
the case is nonsensical in this situation where the actual
sentencing was conducted by a judge who had not taken the plea
and knew very little about the case.
Moreover, any concern about dilatory defendants who are
attempting to delay the administration of justice by failing to
appear at a hearing is remedied by requiring trial judges to
exercise their discretion to proceed in absentia by balancing
"the public interest in proceeding" without the defendant against
the defendant's interests in being present.

See. Smith v. Mann,

173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 120 S.Ct. 200, 145
L.Ed.2d 168; see also United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 3637 (2d Cir. 1989) (court considers not only whether waiver of
right to presence was knowing and voluntary, but also whether
trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the public
interest in proceeding without the defendant outweighed the
defendant's interest in being present); People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.
2d 136, 140-42, 440 N.E.2d 131 (1982) ("trial court must exercise
18

its sound discretion upon consideration of all appropriate
factors'').

Requiring trial courts to balance the public interest

in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present
ensures that the trial courts "vigorously safeguard" the right to
presence.

Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37.

The factors to be

considered when balancing such interests include "the possibility
that [the] defendant could be located within a reasonable period
of time," the difficulty of rescheduling, and the burden on the
state in not proceeding.

Parker, 57 N.Y.2d at 142; see also

Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37.
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing Mr. "Wanosik in absentia where the record fails to
demonstrate that the public interest in proceeding outweighed Mr.
Wanosik's interest in being present.

Mr. Wanosik has been

married 24 years to his wife; they have three children together,
ages 21, 20 and 13.

R.52[5].

He currently holds down a full

time job that he has had since 1990.

R.52[8].

He has also

worked other jobs for significant periods of time, including 11
years as a janitor at a Salt Lake school.

Id.

With such a

stable marital and work history, there is a good likelihood that
Mr. Wanosik could be "located within a reasonable period of time"
had the judge continued sentencing.

Parker, 57 N.Y.2d at 142.

Moreover, AP&P recommended a sentence of 20 days in jail
plus substance abuse treatment for Mr. Wanosik.
Recommendation).

R.52 (PSR Agency

Mr. Wanosik himself admitted in the PSR that
19

drug abuse counseling "wouldn't hurt."

R.52[7].

The combination

of the favorable sentencing recommendation, plus his willingness
to participate in treatment, further indicates that he would be
available "within a reasonable period of time" if sentencing was
continued since it would be to his advantage to do so.
57 N.Y.2d at 142.

Parker,

Indeed, the fact that he did not appear for

sentencing suggests that he likely had the wrong date because he
had no incentive to avoid such a favorable sentencing
recommendation.1
As a final matter, the sentencing hearing in all likelihood
could have been rescheduled easily.
142; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37.
require much time.

See Parker. 57 N.Y.2d at

Sentencing hearings do not

The sentencing judge has regular calendars

for sentencings and could include one more hearing on such a
calendar.

In addition, since neither the State nor the Defense

presented any information in regard to sentencing, a delay in

AP&P's favorable recommendation also alleviates any
concerns that Frederick might have that Mr. Wanosik could not be
located within a reasonable time based on a 1995 retail theft
conviction for which a warrant issued six times. R.52[4].
AP&P's recommendation is an implicit recognition that he is ready
and willing to go to counseling to the extent that the conviction
and six warrants occurred a long time ago; he did not accrue any
other charges until this present conviction, and no others are
pending, Id.; Mr. Wanosik has otherwise conducted his life
responsibly; he has a very limited adult criminal record and no
juvenile record; and any involvement he has had with the criminal
justice system is a result of his "minimal" drug abuse history.
R.52[9]. Accordingly, the public interest in sentencing Mr.
Wanosik in absentia is not outweighed by his interest his right
to be present. See Mann, 173 F.3d at 76; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at
37; Parker, 57 N.Y. 2d at 140-42.
20

sentencing would not burden the State or create the risk that
information would be lost.
Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37.

See Parker, 57 N.Y.2d at 142;
Since the public interest did not

require immediate sentencing in this case, Mr. Wanosik's interest
in being present outweighed any public interest in proceeding.
See Mann, 173 F.3d at 76; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37; Parker, 57
N.Y. 2d at 140-42.

The trial judge, therefore, abused his

discretion in sentencing Mr. Wanosik in absentia.

See Mann, 173

F.3d at 76; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37; Parker, 57 N.Y. 2d at 14042.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Anthony James Wanosik respectfully
requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand his case
fora full and fair sentencing proceeding.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

I Pit

day of October, 2000.

CATHERINE E. LILLY
^
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

L^^KE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THIRD

DISTR];CT C0URT.SALT

STATE OF UTAi-i,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 001905943 FS

AI ITF rOT""'r ""AMES WANOSIK,
Defendant.
Custody . ba";:: Lake County

•Judge:
Ha tie:

J DENNIS FREDERICK
May 26, 2 000

PRESENT
Clerk:
cindyb
Prosecutor: DALESANDRO, NICK
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARLAND, ANDREA
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 21 , 1950
Video
Tape Number:
1
Tape Count: iw:29-lx
CHARGES
1.

ATTEMPTED

ILLEGAL KjJbo/n

HTiOLiihD oifbJTANi'I

i irnnnn^n i -

Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/11/2000 Guilty Plea
2 ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/11/2000 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE JAIL

. .

Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s)
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 6 month(s)
Commitment.

oeu...,, .mmediately.

Pa

Case No: 001905943
Date:
May 26, 2000

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
Credit for 8 days time served. *Based upon defendant's failure to
appear, the Court finds that he voluntarily absented himself from
the sentencing proceedings and the Court sentences the defendant in
absentia. Counsel for State to prepare the findings.*
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Jail terms to run concurrently.
Defendant's pre-trial service release is revoked and the Court
orders that a non-bailable bench warrant issue for the defendant
returnable forthwith.
*..

Page 2 (last)

ADDENDUM B

F I U B PffTRJCT COURT
Third Judicial District

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
N. M. D'ALESANDRO, Bar No. 4818
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

JUN 1 4 201

TM THF TH IP I) DISTRICT 'OUPT SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

TH1- STVO III HI All

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-V-

Case No MHWSWr.S

ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK,

Hon. J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

The imposition of sentencing in the above-entitled matter came on foi hearing
bdoi'i

Mi

i

iiiiiil

n I Li1,

'"in

'linn

, iHin a mi i,iil,mil, S a l t L a k e L e g a l

Association, was present representing the defendant.
r e p r e s e n t e d n» hi I ni i i iim iiiiiiiiiii m pin j i i i i i n i

winim

Defender

Plaintiff, State of Utah, was
m ii it'inLiim

Minimis

Limes

Wanosik was not present.
Based on the record in the above-enti
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

. g

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant was charged by Information with Unlawful Possession of a

Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a
Class B Misdemeanor, for acts alleged to have occurred on March 27, 2000, in Salt Lake
County, Utah.
2.

On April 11, 2000, before the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, defendant

waived his right to a preliminary hearing and entered pleas of guilty to Attempted
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, and Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class B Misdemeanor.
3.

Judge Atherton dismissed a charge of Unlawful Possession of Drug

Paraphernalia based on a plea negotiation.
3.

Defendant was represented at all times during the entry of his guilty pleas

by Andrea Garland, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association.
4.

Following the entry of the defendant's guilty pleas on April 11, 2000,

defendant was informed that sentencing was scheduled before this Court on May 26,
2000, at 8:30 a.m.
5.

Defendant was not present as scheduled before this Court on May 26,

2000, and did not appear at any time during the morning criminal calendar.
6.

Defendant's counsel, Andrea Garland, could not explain to the Court why

her client was not present.
7.

Defendant did not contact the Court before or during the sentencing to

explain his absence.

8

without valid excuse, absented himself from

the Court on May 26,2000.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1

A defendant may be sentenced m .il^ciilu a.-, n

i Inl l>, Rules 17(a)(2)

J iii! ?? of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2.

Defendant waived his right to be present tt>f hi si'iHui. uti

i M*1 .''>,

nformed of the date and was voluntarily absent form the
proceedings.

DATED this £th day 01
BY TfeE COURT:

Approved as to form:

Jnd^Sb^

Andrea Garland ,
Attorney for Defendant

FILMIBISTRJCT C8VBT

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
N. M. D'ALESANDRO, Bar No. 4818
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

Third Judicial District

JUN t 4 2001

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
-V-

Case No. 001905943FS

ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK,
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

The Court having reviewed the record and the law, having made findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and being fully advised of the premises,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant be sentencejHn absentia on May 26, 2000.

DATED this

f f -day of

JJl

J ' v. •

^r Judge

~ r^.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing Proposed Fin lings • : f
hid

"I iHnilJ iii in Ml I .in1

IIIH

Proposed Order were placed in the courier box, for

delivery to Andrea Garland, attorney for defendant ANTHONY JAJVtEb
East

'he 5th day of June, 2000.
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